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Abstract 
Substantial and systematic cross-country variation in entrepreneurship rates has been found in 
various studies. We attempt to explain such differences focusing on the interaction between 
institutional factors and population psychological characteristics. Constitutional provisions 
supporting economic freedom is our measure of the institutional context, whereas we proxy 
psychological characteristics with a country’s endowment of agency culture. We apply an IV-
GMM treatment to deal with endogeneity to a dataset comprising 86 countries over the period 
2004-2013 and we control for de facto variables and other factors that are likely to influence 
entrepreneurship. Our results demonstrate that agency culture is indeed an important predictor 
of entrepreneurship and that this effect is moderated by constitutional provisions supporting 
economic freedom. In particular, the impact of agency culture on entrepreneurship becomes 
stronger as a country expands the constitutional protection of economic rights.  
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1.  Introduction 
Cross-country comparison of industry dynamics and exploration of its determinants and 
consequences has traditionally attracted the interest of researchers in both industrial and 
developing countries (see Caves, 1998; and Bartelsman et al., 2009 for surveys). The results of 
this literature show that substantial and systematic differences in industry dynamics are 
generated also by country-specific institutional and cultural factors (see, for example, Bottazzi 
et al., 2010; Bartelsman et al., 2013; Nisczota, 2014). 
The aim of the present paper is to study the interplay between the economic constitution 
of a country (institutional factor) and the macro-psychological traits of its population (cultural 
factor) in shaping cross-country differences in entrepreneurship rates. Our hypothesis is that 
constitutional protection of economic freedom may together create an institutional setting that 
favors the transformation of the innate agentic attitude of a country’s population into actual 
entrepreneurship. It follows from this assumption that differences in the constitutions and the 
endowment of agency culture, and also their interplay, may explain the cross-country variation 
in industry dynamics. We conduct our analysis using a sample comprising 86 countries over the 
period 2004-2013 (see list in Table 1). 
Taking a law & economics perspective we focus on four principles stated in national 
constitutions: The right to conduct/establish a business, the right to free/competitive markets, 
the right to own property, and the independence of the judiciary organs. The first two principles 
have been proven in the law & economics literature to exert a significant impact on 
entrepreneurship (Carbonara et al., 2016). The right to own property (Besley and Ghatak, 2010) 
and the independence of the judiciary organs (Djankov et al., 2003, Chemin, 2009) are widely 
considered key factors in economic development. The use of constitutional provisions as proxy 
for institutional characteristics stems from the fact that constitutional laws represent 
hierarchically higher norms that cannot be opposed by ordinary laws and other rules (Kelsen, 
1967). Thus, they represent the highest protection that a country can assign to rights. However, 
often the laws in the books remain unenforced (especially when they clash with social norms 
that are firmly embedded in culture: Carbonara et al., 2012, Acemoglu and Jackson, 2016). That 
is why de jure protection of legal rights does not necessarily imply a de facto protection and we 
need to control for the actual implementation of the principles stated in the constitution, 
including measures of economic freedom based on rule of law, government size, regulatory 
efficiency and market openness.  
The psychological literature has placed great importance on personality traits, arguing 
that regional differences in personality constitute a local culture that in turn influences regional 
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entrepreneurship rates (cf., among others, Davidsson, 1995; Leutner et al., 2014; Obschonka et 
al., 2015; Stuetzer et al., 2016). Such a personality-based perspective on culture (Hofstede and 
McCrae, 2004) has enriched our understanding of the historical origins (e.g., Stuetzer et al., 
2016) and economic effects of regional differences in an entrepreneurial culture (Davidsson, 
1995; Steel et al., 2012; Rentfrow et al., 2013; Audretsch et al., 2017).  
To date, the law & economics and the psychological streams of literature have not been 
integrated in the explanation of the overall process of industry dynamics. There is good reason 
to suppose that combining them could prove profitable, with some studies hinting at the promise 
of such integrative perspectives. For example, Obschonka et al. (2015) examined the so-called 
“knowledge paradox”, which is the phenomenon whereby investments in resources for 
generating knowledge (e.g., education, diversity of industries) do not guarantee higher 
entrepreneurship rates; analyses revealed that knowledge resources are more likely to increase 
entrepreneurship rates in a region which also has a high number of residents with an 
entrepreneurship-prone personality. In other words, psychological (in this case, entrepreneurial 
personality) and institutional determinants (in this case, knowledge resources) may interact to 
yield better predictions about entrepreneurial activity than the additive effects of both 
determinants assessed in isolation.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the literature dealing 
with cross-national differences in entrepreneurship rates, and the impact of psychological traits 
and constitutional provisions on entrepreneurship. Section 3 presents the main research 
questions and theoretical explanations. Section 4 describes the data set. Section 5 presents the 
estimation model and econometric strategy. Section 6 discusses the findings of the empirical 
analysis. Finally, Section 7 offers some conclusions based on these findings. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In economics, agentic behavior is usually defined within a rational-choice perspective, 
assuming that agency is mainly characterized by the maximization of one’s own benefits: all 
actors are narrowly self-interested, all actors are boundedly rational, and agents are more risk 
averse than principals are (Bosse and Phillips, 2016). However, this approach neglects inter-
individual psychological differences (i.e., personality characteristics motivating, guiding, and 
directing decisions and activities), which have been shown to predict a wide array of 
consequential life outcomes and economic behaviors, even when controlling for the effects of 
socio-economic status, demographic variables, and cognitive ability (Roberts et al., 2007).  
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Psychological research points to some sort of psychological benefit for the individual 
(or the avoidance of negative, harmful states) if he or she can behave in accordance with his or 
her individual personality structure (Frey, 2008). Psychological theories suggest that peoples’ 
behavior can best be understood by an interplay between person variables (like personality) and 
the context (cf., among others, Lewin, 1935, 1951; Ajzen, 1985; Funder, 2006), which means 
that it might be worth analyzing carefully the interaction between psychological traits and 
constitutional provisions. The agentic perspective is widely regarded as a leading meta-theory 
of human behavior in psychology (Bandura, 2006), sociology (Elder, 1994), economics 
(Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979), law (Parker, 2007), and management (Begley and Boyd, 1987).  
2.1 Cross-country differences in entrepreneurship rates 
Some countries experience higher rates of new firm formation every year than other 
countries do (Carree et al., 2002; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). From a theoretical viewpoint, 
two main explanations of this empirical regularity have pervaded the recent debate.  
On the one side, based on the observation that developed Western countries have 
become more entrepreneurial following globalization, Audretsch and Thurik (2000) 
hypothesize that such countries switch to new industries - such as software and biotechnology, 
in which small businesses and entrepreneurship are more important – only once they have lost 
their comparative advantage in large scale manufacturing. Thus, high rates of new firm 
formation are typical of developed countries since the aftermath of the Information and 
Communication Technology revolution. This pattern might suggest that a country’s endowment 
of agency culture evolves in response to historical and institutional changes.  
On the other side, Galor and Michalopoulos (2012) suggest that entrepreneurial spirit 
has evolved non-monotonically in the course of history, through a Darwinian process. In the 
early stages of a country’s development, risk-tolerant entrepreneurial traits proved successful 
in promoting technological progress and economic development, whereas in mature stages of 
development, risk-averse traits prevailed, diminishing the growth potential of advanced 
economies. Thus, modern developed countries should experience lower rates of new firm 
formation. This latter approach implies that a country’s endowment of agency culture is linked 
to its stage of economic development rather than to time-invariant psychological features; 
hence, agency culture would tend to vanish as societies evolve, develop more complex 
institutional arrangements, and achieve higher levels of per capita income.  
Both of the views outlined above are consistent with the idea that the reason why 
countries with similar economic fundamentals differ in entrepreneurial activity may ultimately 
be found in cultural and institutional differences (Guiso et al., 2003; Stuetzer et al., 2016). The 
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positions of Audretsch and Thurik (2000) and Galor and Michalopoulos (2012) can therefore 
be reconciled within a broader line of investigation, which spans from Diamond (1997) to 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) (cf. also Saxenian, 1994; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Autio et al., 
2014). In fact, the empirical literature on the cross-country differences in start-up rates has 
provided several contributions which can be reconciled with each of the two explanations.  
Guiso et al. (2006) show that the cultural background of individuals plays a role in their 
decision to become entrepreneurs and therefore also shapes attitudes toward entrepreneurship 
at the region and country level. By the same token, Audretsch et al. (2017) posit the importance 
of culture as a primary determinant of variations in economic, political, and social phenomena 
across geographic space. They aggregate individual-level personality data to the level of each 
of the 3,137 US counties to analyse the impact of a social and cultural imprinting on the rate of 
new firm formation at the county level. Wennekers et al. (2005) found a U-shaped relationship 
between a country’s start-up rate and a country’s level of economic development, with the 
impact of entrepreneurial dynamics on economic growth being smaller for developing 
countries. In contrast, Blanchflower (2000) showed that the overall trend of entrepreneurial 
activities does not follow the stages of a country’s development; rather, the trend shows a 
negative relationship with a country’s unemployment rate. Bruck et al. (2011) found that 
entrepreneurship rates follow a history-dependent path and are subject to the influence of 
exogenous factors, with entrepreneurship rates being positively affected by extreme events such 
as natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Dealing with 85 countries between 2005 and 2014, 
Dheer (2017) has shown that an institutional setting that guarantees economic freedom affects 
the rate of entrepreneurial activity more in individualistic societies than in collectivistic ones. 
This is a clear indication that population psychological characteristics play a role in positively 
moderating the effect of pro-market institutional arrangements on entrepreneurship. Our study 
falls within the same line of investigation, although we use different measures for 
entrepreneurship and for economic freedom protection and we focus on different countries.  A 
positive relationship between presence of an institutional framework able to promote economic 
freedom and various measures of entrepreneurship was found also by Biørnskov and Foss 
(2008) and Nyström (2008). 
 
The above empirical evidence seems to suggest there is no single unique economic 
factor explaining cross-country differences in start-up rates. Differences might persist over time 
regardless of a country’s level of economic development. Cultural differences might shape a 
country’s proneness toward entrepreneurial activity and are therefore a factor that needs 
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consideration and integration. A country’s culture (e.g., its endowment of social capital; Guiso 
et al., 2008; or the national levels in personality traits, Hofstede and McCrae, 2004; Steel et al., 
2012), interacts with and is shaped by the features and quality of a country’s institutions. 
Institutions are therefore an important aspect of a country’s profile and their impact extends 
from economic development (Guiso et al., 2003) to entrepreneurship (Acs et al., 2008; 
Carbonara et al. 2016). Culture and institutions are ultimately endogenous variables 
contributing to the wealth of countries. Extending the arguments proposed by Alesina and 
Giuliano (2015), we assume here that the psychological traits of a country’s population and the 
provisions contained in a country’s constitution are, respectively, aspects of a country’s culture 
and a country’s institutions.  
 
2.2 Psychological agency and entrepreneurship  
The focus on an individual’s personal agency has long played a key role in seminal 
theorizing in the entrepreneurship literature (e.g., McClelland, 1961). In fact, Schumpeter 
himself (1911, p.131, as translated from German in Santarelli and Pesciarelli, 1990), in the first 
German edition of his Theory of Economic Development (1934) stressed that entrepreneurs are 
“personalities who in se possess the rules of their actions” (for a detailed discussion of this 
issue, cf. Santarelli and Pesciarelli, 1990). Empirical entrepreneurship research has usually tried 
to capture such personal agency by focusing on an entrepreneur’s actual actions (e.g., Frese, 
2009; Zhao et al., 2010; Hmieleski et al., 2015) or self-efficacy belief (e.g., Hechavarria et al., 
2012; Wennberg et al., 2013). Here, we apply a novel approach to capture psychological 
agency, assessing it in terms of agentic personality traits (Digman, 1997). This approach is 
based on the leading and best researched model of personality traits, the Big Five model (John 
and Srivastava, 1999). This approach of assessing agency also allows us to draw from 
geographical approaches in the study of regional and national differences in these personality 
traits (Rentfrow et al., 2008; Steel et al., 2012). 
In psychology, Digman’s (1997) influential work on higher-order traits (or super traits) 
established that two Big Five traits, extraversion and openness to new experience, form a 
higher-order trait that can be labelled ‘psychological agency’. Drawing from that approach, we 
measure agency culture at the nation-level. Populations living in countries characterized by a 
high level of agency culture are highly active and assertive (components of extraversion), highly 
creative and open to change (components of openness to experience). Accordingly, aggregates 
of individual scores on traits are used as proxies for agency culture (for similar approaches to 
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assess cultural dimensions see Davidsson, 1995; Rentfrow et al., 2008, 2013; Steel et al., 2012; 
Stuetzer et al., 2016; Audretsch et al., 2017).  
In contrast to a purely rational-choice approach, the psychological approach defines 
agency by means of relatively stable personality traits that motivate, guide, and direct manifest 
individual agency. This psychological agency approach has largely been neglected in economic 
models of agency and entrepreneurship, despite the demonstrated importance of psychological 
models in economics (Borghans et al., 2008). In fact, psychological research has challenged the 
pure rational-choice view by pointing towards the relevance of “irrational” decision-making 
processes involving personality traits. A wide array of basic personality traits can have 
considerable influence on economic outcomes: for example, a recent study showed that 
entrepreneurial activity in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008-2009 was predicted better 
by regional personality differences than regional infra-structure parameters (“economic 
muscles”, such as human and financial capital) (Obschonka et al., 2016). 
 
2.3 Entrepreneurship, agency culture, and the moderating effect of national 
constitutions 
Recent meta-analytic studies suggest significant relationships between personality and 
both revealed preference for becoming an entrepreneur (latent entrepreneurship) (Zhao et al., 
2010) and entrepreneurial performance after start-up (Brandstaetter, 2011). However, there has 
been little investigation about the importance of personality as a predictor of the probability of 
actually being an entrepreneur (manifest entrepreneurship) (Grilo and Thurik, 2006; Baron and 
Baum, 2007; Audretsch et al. 2017).  
The level of agency culture in a country represents an important component of the 
overall cultural context within which entrepreneurial activity takes place. The relationship 
between a broader definition of culture – encompassing customary beliefs and values that are 
transmitted from generation to generation – and the likelihood of engaging in entrepreneurship 
has been explored by a line of investigation initiated by Guiso et al. (2006). Following the idea 
put forward by Glaeser et al. (2000), Guiso et al. (2006) assume that individuals who express 
trust have a comparative advantage in becoming entrepreneurs. Then, studying the impact of a 
measure of trust weighted for religious and ethnic background on the probability of a sample of 
individuals becoming entrepreneurs, Guiso et al. (2006) use an instrumental variable approach 
to confirm that trustworthy individuals will have a comparative advantage in becoming 
entrepreneurs. In the same way, defining a cultural variable along the dimension of 
individualism-collectivism, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010) show that individualism has a 
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dynamic advantage leading to a higher economic growth rate, whereas collectivism leads only 
to static efficiency gains.  
Then, a further element is added to the investigation initiated by Guiso et al. (2006): 
institutions (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). Culture and institutions interact and evolve in a 
complementary way,  both playing a role as determinants of the wealth of countries. 
Consequently, the same institutions may exert a different impact in different cultural contexts. 
Alesina and Giuliano (2015) identify a wide range of interactions between various types of 
political and legal institutions and various cultural traits such as trust, family ties, generalized 
morality and individualism. Lerner and Tåg (2013) show that institutional differences in the 
legal environment led to the later development of an active venture capital market in Sweden 
compared with the United States, where this source of external funding largely contributed to 
the emergence of clusters of innovative start-ups. 
The antinomy, individualism versus collectivism, is an important dimension of cultural 
variation across countries (Greif, 1994; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2010; Alesina and 
Giuliano, 2015). Individualism is a trait that can make personal accomplishments more socially 
acceptable, so it is likely to be associated with a greater proneness to entrepreneurship. But for 
this cultural trait to result into actual action, the overall institutional setting should be proactive 
and remove the obstacles to the full display of individualism in the economic sphere. Consistent 
with this principle, within the broader field of law & economics, the public choice literature has 
emphasized (since the seminal contribution of Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) that a strong 
connection exists between a country’s economic performance and the main features of its 
constitution. Such a connection is likely not direct, but rather the result of the effectiveness of 
constitutions in shaping a country’s prevailing institutional arrangements (Melton et al., 2013; 
Carbonara et al., 2016). In relation to how constitutions may make it easier to turn individualism 
into actual entrepreneurial action, it is worth acknowledging that at least since France’s National 
Constituent Assembly passed the Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen  in 1789, 
general recognition and protection of private property had been held to be universal and most 
constitutions started to protect property rights.  
The first empirical work on the impact of constitutions on economic performance dates 
back to the early 2000s; this work showed the positive impact jointly exerted by a presidential 
system and the majoritarian electoral rule on, among other things, total factor productivity and 
reduction of public expenditure (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Research has also shown that 
direct democratic institutions affect fiscal policy and government efficiency (Blume et al., 
2009). More recently, the optimal number of national representatives in relation to a country’s 
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population size has been calculated (Auriol and Gary-Bobo, 2012); analyses suggest that an 
excessive number of national representatives is correlated with indicators of red tape and 
barriers to entrepreneurship.  
Moreover, the efficiency of the judiciary positively affects entrepreneurship. 
Constitutional provisions do play a role in making a judiciary system more efficient, for 
example, by stating that it must be independent from external influences. A well-functioning 
judiciary system facilitates access to finance and reduces the likelihood of contract breach 
(Chemin, 2009, 2012). The more a judiciary system is independent from the influence of both 
the other branches of government and partisan interests, the more judges are free to make 
impartial decisions based exclusively on fact and the rule of law. As a result, an independent 
and more efficient judiciary system may exert a direct impact on entrepreneurship, while it 
leaves the exit rate unaltered (Chemin, 2012; Garcia-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2015). 
Highly skilled and better educated entrepreneurs take advantage of better access to justice 
(Lichand and Soares, 2014 on Brazilian data). Thus, reforms aimed at improving the efficiency 
of the judiciary may affect entrepreneurship positively among individuals with higher levels of 
education but not among those with lower educational levels. Education is a proxy for wealth, 
so this result seems to indicate that judicial change in Brazil pushed wealthier individuals 
towards entrepreneurship. 
Carbonara et al. (2016) show for 115 countries that constitutional provisions are the 
main institutional driver of entrepreneurship. Dealing with the endogeneity of constitutional 
rules, and controlling for de facto variables, they find that provisions about the right to 
conduct/establish a business, the right to strike, consumer protection, anti-corruption, and 
compulsory education promote higher rates of new firm formation.  
 
3. Main hypotheses 
In what follows, we extend the investigation of the relationship between culture and 
institutions in the context of entrepreneurship by exploring the interaction between agency 
culture and the aspect of legal institutions represented by the provisions supporting economic 
freedom that are contained in national constitutions. We put a special focus on the interplay 
between agency culture and these aspects of the legal institutions within a country. 
To quantify psychological differences in agency we apply the personality-based 
approach to culture (Rentfrow et al., 2008), which aggregates individual-level personality traits 
to estimate local cultural differences (Stuetzer et al., 2016). This approach has delivered 
promising findings in research predicting regional outcomes, including social, economic, 
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political, and health outcomes (Rentfrow et al., 2013; Jokela et al., 2015). The basic idea 
underlying this research is that regional personality differences constitute the pillars of the local 
culture, affecting the developmental trajectories of whole regions (Hofstede and McCrae, 
2004).  
In psychological science, there is broad consensus that the five-factor model of 
personality is the best-established, validated, and cross-culturally valid model of personality 
(cf., among many others, Digman, 1997; Benet-Martinez and John, 1998; John and Srivastava, 
1999; Zhao and Seibert, 2006; Lang et al., 2011; Gebauer et al., 2014a; Vedel, 2014). The Big 
Five personality traits constituting this five-factor model are extraversion, conscientiousness, 
openness, agreeableness, and neuroticism. The Big Five traits can be further summarized in the 
form of higher order “super” traits (Wiggins, 2003). Based on analyses of child, adolescent, and 
adult samples, Digman (1997) established two higher order “super” traits: α (consisting of 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, and neuroticism) and β (consisting of extraversion and 
openness). α can be described as a dimension encapsulating themes of communion and β can 
be described as a dimension encapsulating themes of agency (Wiggins, 1991). The β super trait 
also includes such traits as superiority striving, individuation, personal growth, self-
actualization, achieving status, and power motivation (Digman, 1997). These traits are 
associated with both agency and entrepreneurial behavior (Zhao and Seibert, 2006) making β a 
good candidate for indexing psychological agency in a way that’s relevant for entrepreneurship. 
The study of such super factors (e.g., agency and communion) has received considerable 
attention in recent years (Blackburn et al., 2004; De Young, 2006; Abele and Wojciszke, 2007; 
Vecchione and Alessandri, 2013; Gebauer et al., 2014b), but this trend has not been mirrored 
in economic research, which has remained focused on narrower personality traits or profiles 
(Borghans et al., 2008; Stuetzer et al., 2016).  
With the aim to combine the views that institutional factors and population 
psychological characteristics are drivers of new firm formation, in line with the approach 
established by Dheer (2017), we aim to test the degree to which the combination of agency 
culture and pro-market constitutional framework combine to predict entrepreneurial activity. 
Thus, extending Carbonara et al. (2016), we take the constitutional protection granted to some 
principles relevant for economic activity and their de facto implementation (cf. also Carlsson et 
al., 2009; Czarnitzki et al., 2016) as proxies for the institutional determinants of 
entrepreneurship. 
Consistent with the bounded agency approach, we predict that boundary conditions (in 
the form of national constitutional framework) will shape the overall impact of agency culture 
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on a country’s proneness toward entrepreneurial activity. Accordingly, pro-entrepreneurship 
constitutions cannot stimulate new business formation across countries as expected if people in 
those countries are not sufficiently proactive and innovative to exploit the benefits of the created 
favourable constitutional environment. Broadening the perspective followed in the previous 
empirical literature – from Blau (1987) to Acs et al. (2009) – and extending previous findings 
by Carbonara et al. (2016), we take into account the possible moderating effect of a specific 
aspect of the institutional setting, represented by the provisions contained in a country’s 
constitution. Particularly, we focus on two central hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1a. The level of agency culture and the presence in the constitutions of 
provisions supporting economic freedom predict a country’s level of entrepreneurial activity.  
Hypothesis 1b. Following the bounded agency perspective, the constitutional 
environment moderates the effect of agency culture on entrepreneurship.  
  
4. Data 
4.1 Dependent variable 
New business density. Using data from the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship 
Database, we construct a measure of new business density, given by the number of new business 
registrations (private, formal sector companies with limited liability) in every year in each 
country per 1,000 residents aged 15-64 over the period 2004-2013. Our dependent variable is a 
standard measure of the total start-up activity in 86 countries (Table 1). It is a measure of 
entrepreneurship that follows a labor market approach (Audretsch and Fritsch, 1994): all firms 
are the result of individual actions, and new entrepreneurs are individuals who had previously 
or have been interested in having a dependent job, who exploit their knowledge of production 
processes and market features to switch to independent work (Santarelli and Sterlacchini, 1994; 
Gries and Naudé, 2011). Accordingly, each individual in the labor pool is considered a potential 
entrepreneur, with the capability to set up his or her own business. We believe that this measure 
of entrepreneurship is best suited to study the impact of cultural and institutional factors on 
entrepreneurship because we are in fact focusing on how individual private initiative is fostered 
or jeopardized by culture and institutions. Other available and commonly used measures include 
the ratio of new entrants on existing firms, adopted in the so called ecological approach (Tag 
et al., 2016), and the number of business owners per labor force (Acs et al., 2009). However, 
such measures are less interesting for our purposes. The ecological approach measures new 
start-up activity relative to existing entrepreneurship, thus capturing only one component of the 
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overall process. The percentage of the self-employed is more suited for a study on occupational 
choices whereas here we are more interested in a story of entrepreneurial success. 
- Table 1 about here –  
 
4.2 Independent variables 
Agency culture. We utilize personality data collected by the ongoing, global Gosling-
Potter Internet project (Gosling et al., 2004; see also Gebauer et al., 2015; Rentfrow et al., 2013, 
2015). The project collects personality data via a noncommercial Internet website, which can 
be reached through several channels (e.g., search engines, unsolicited links on other webpages). 
People voluntarily participate in this study by responding to items on a standard Big Five 
personality questionnaire (in English, German, Spanish, or Dutch) using a 5-point Likert scale 
(1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly); as an incentive, participants receive a personality 
evaluation based on their responses. Participants also provide responses to questions on several 
socio-demographic variables, and report their state of residence. This database has yielded 
numerous publications relating personality traits to various aspects of human behavior. Its 
validity is supported by the number and quality of publications, mainly in the field of 
psychology, which have used data from this large-scale Internet project. Of most relevance to 
the current work, smaller versions of this dataset have been successfully employed in cross-
cultural studies (e.g. Bleidorn et al., 2013; Gebauer et al., 2015). For a list of published studies 
using the database, see http://www.thebigfiveproject.com/published-papers/). 
To estimate cross-country differences in agency culture, we use data from all 
respondents who completed the questionnaire from the start of the project in December 1998 
until 2015. In total, N = 7,092,784 respondents are included in this dataset. The number of 
respondents in each country ranges between 1,008 (Ethiopia) and 4,275,860 (USA). Table 2 
provides an overview over the sample sizes in each country under study.  
- Table 2 about here –  
Country-level agency scores were derived in two steps. In the first step, participants’ 
extraversion and openness scores were computed and these were averaged to yield an agency 
score at the individual level. In the second step, individuals’ scores were aggregated within 
country, yielding country-level scores for agency culture.  
Constitutional protection. As noted in Section 2.1 above, several provisions contained 
in national constitutions affect the dynamics of entrepreneurship. Information about 
constitutional provisions is drawn from the Comparative Constitutions Project: A Cross-
National Historical Dataset of Written Constitutions (henceforth CCP) (Elkins et al., 2009), an 
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archive of data on the features of written constitutions for most countries since 1789. We focus 
on four provisions that represent how a constitution can protect the market mechanism, to derive 
an integrated variable by summing up: right to own property, right to conduct/establish a 
business, right to free/competitive markets, and independence of the judiciary organs. This 
Constitutional protection variable ranges from 0 (constitution not mentioning any of the 4 
provisions) to 4 (constitution mentions all four provisions). Constitutional provisions represent 
the pillars of a country’s legal and institutional framework and they should be enforced by 
'lower' laws, which are hierarchically subordinate to constitutions. Often, in fact, lawmakers 
enact new rules at the constitutional level as a commitment device to guarantee their application 
(Kelsen, 1967). For example, legal reforms increasing the protection of investors’ rights – and 
therefore consistent with constitutional protection of the free market – might  lead to lower use 
of control enhancing mechanisms and ultimately create conditions more favorable to the 
emergence of a corporate economy dominated by widely held corporations (Cuomo et al., 
2012). However, to control for their de facto implementation and to measure whether and to 
what extent ‘higher’ constitutional norms are enforced by the legal and institutional framework, 
and effectively protect economic freedom, we need to measure the functioning of the market 
mechanism. For this purpose, we use the Index of Economic Freedom calculated by the Heritage 
Foundation, (http://www.heritage.org/index/). The index measures economic freedom based on 
four broad categories, each of which includes three or four types of economic freedom (in 
parentheses): rule of law (property rights, government integrity, judicial effectiveness), 
government size (government spending, tax burden, fiscal health), regulatory efficiency 
(business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom), and open markets (trade freedom, 
investment freedom, financial freedom). Each of the factors shaping the four broad categories 
is graded on a scale from 0 to 100 and a country’s score is obtained by averaging the resulting 
twelve values with equal weight given to each.  
 
 
4.3 Control variables 
To control for the general economic foundations of each country, we consider the 
following set of control variables. To capture the wealth of countries and labor market 
characteristics, we use GDP per capita and the percentage of residents aged 15 or more who are 
part of the labor force. Other control variables are electric consumption (in Kwh) per capita, as 
a proxy of the business cycle, and mobile cellular subscription per 100 residents as a proxy of 
the quality of the infrastructures. Table 3 presents variable descriptions and summary statistics 
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(mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum) for all variables included in the analysis, 
and Table 4 presents the corresponding correlation matrix. 
- Table 3 about here –  
- Table 4 about here -  
 
5. Model Development 
For the purposes of our empirical analysis, we opted for a parsimonious specification, 
hypothesizing the following structural model:  !"# = % + '("# + )*" + +("# ∗ *" + -."# + /"# 
where !"# denotes new business density of country i in year t; ("# is an indicator of constitutional 
protection of economic freedom and rights in country i and year t; *" represents a measure of 
agency culture for country i;	+("# ∗ *"  is the interaction between the constitutional and the 
psychological variable; ."# is a set of other control variables; /"# is the usual error term. The 
interaction term is added to the model for testing the hypotheses that the impact exerted by the 
relationship between endowment of agency culture and the strength of constitutional protection 
was different for different levels of agency and constitutional protection. 
The Breusch-Pagan test indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity1 . The White’s 
method of correcting for heteroskedastic errors should then be applied. The Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data also indicates the presence of serial correlation in our dataset2. The 
Hausman test reveals the existence of an endogeneity problem for our constitutional variable3. 
Constitution is likely to be endogenous, because economies are not exogenously endowed with 
the institutions and incentives that make up their entrepreneurial environment, but rather 
institutions are determined endogenously, perhaps influenced by the history, geographical 
features, and level of entrepreneurship in an economy.  
The presence of heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and endogeneity in our dataset 
deserves careful treatment in choosing an appropriate estimation model. On the one hand, robust 
pooled OLS estimation fails to give unbiased and efficient estimators, and instrumental variable 
two-staged least square (2SLS) could be a wise choice. On the other hand, our data incur the 
problem of heteroskedasticity, so we apply the IV generalized method of moments (GMM) 
technique, which gives more reliable and consistent estimation results (Baum and Schaffer, 
2003). The IV-GMM treatment requires the availability and validity of exogenous instruments 
																																								 																				
1	12(1) = 142.17; p-value = 0.0000 
2 F (1, 85) = 15.944; p-value = 0.0001	
3	12(2) = 12.982; p-value = 0.0015	
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that are correlated with the independent variables for which endogeneity has been detected, but 
that are uncorrelated with the measure of new business density. We adopt two instrumental 
variables: the distance from the equator used by Hall and Jones (1999) and the predicted trade 
share of an economy constructed by Frankel and Romer (1996). The underidentification test 
and the Sargan test to detect the relevance and validity of our IVs do support our approach, and 
thus our choice of instruments is plausible (see Table 6).  
As robustness checks, we estimate three extra models. We estimate a dynamic Blundell-
Bond (1998) GMM model, including the lagged dependent variable to consider the potential 
effect of the business cycle and the lagged value of constitutional protection to account for 
institutional change. This model allows for a low-order moving average correlation in the 
idiosyncratic errors and is well suited to deal with the low variance in the process of 
constitutional change, with the time-invariant nature of the agency culture variable, and with 
the relatively small longitudinal length of the dataset (only one decade). Moreover, to account 
for unobserved country effects across time, the third and the fourth models are country-Fixed 
Effect OLS and GLS. 
 
6. Empirical Results and Discussion 
6.1 Regression results 
We start by estimating regressions with Agency culture as the main and only explanatory 
variable. The results from the dynamic Blundell-Bond (1998) GMM, the country-Fixed Effect 
OLS, and the country-Fixed Effect GLS models presented in Table 5, show a positive and 
highly statistically significant impact of stronger agency culture on our measure of 
entrepreneurship: the first part of Hypothesis 1a is therefore supported. Higher labor force 
participation rate and better infrastructures (i.e., more widespread adoption of mobile cellular 
phones) are also associated with higher levels of new business density.  
- Table 5 about here - 
We then turn to the discussion of the general model (Table 6). As far as the main 
variables of interest (Agency culture and Constitutional protection) are concerned, the results 
of the estimates show a consistent pattern across the IV-GMM, the dynamic Blundell-Bond 
(1998) GMM, the country-Fixed Effect OLS, and the country-Fixed Effect GLS models. In 
Table 6 we present three specifications for each of the four methodological treatments: the first 
specification controls for the effect of constitutional protection only (columns 1, 4, and 7); the 
second specification considers both constitutional protection and psychological agency culture 
(columns 2, 5, and 8); and the third specification takes into account their interaction effect as 
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well (columns 3, 6, and 9). Our data incur the problem of heteroskedasticity, serial 
autocorrelation, and endogeneity of constitutional protection, so the static IV-GMM model with 
robust SEs is the most appropriate estimation method; thus, we base our interpretation on the 
results of this model. Results from the other model specifications are also traced for the purpose 
of comparison.  
- Table 6 about here -  
Our findings show that constitutional protection of economic freedom plays a key role 
in generating the wide variation in entrepreneurship across countries (columns 1, 4 and 7). The 
second part of Hypothesis 1a is therefore confirmed. Consistent with the findings of Bell et al. 
(2008) and Parker (2009, Ch. 15) on legal rules, we too find that when institutions support 
economic freedom, entrepreneurship is stronger. With respect to diffusion in each country’s 
population of the agency culture (columns 2, 5 and 8), in all estimates the coefficient is largely 
positive and statistically significant at a 99% confidence level. A stronger agency culture is thus 
associated with a higher level of new business density, and corresponds to a greater propensity 
of individuals to create their own entrepreneurial ventures. Unsurprisingly, countries with high 
agency culture foster the development of a more dynamic entrepreneurial climate. Our findings 
therefore suggest a possible way of promoting the propensity to become entrepreneurs in the 
overall population through training activities for elating agentic characteristics, such as 
creativity, risk-taking propensity and entrepreneurial proactiveness. However, when the impact 
of the psychological ‘agency’ trait is taken into account, the institutional factor, despite having 
positive influence, loses its statistical significance on new business density in the IV-GMM, 
while maintaining it in all other model specifications.  
Looking at the interaction between agency culture and constitutional protection 
(columns 3, 6 and 9), consistent with the bounded agency approach, and with our Hypothesis 
1b, the effect of agency culture on entrepreneurship is indeed bounded by the characteristics of 
the national constitutions. These two factors do combine in such a way that the effect of high 
agency culture is strengthened in countries with a pro-entrepreneurship constitution. Similarly, 
the constitutional protection of economic freedom leverages the entrepreneurial intention of 
countries with a great endowment of agency culture. A healthy business environment facilitates 
nascent entrepreneurs to discover and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities. 
The positive effect of constitutional protection and agency culture is also corroborated 
by the positive and statistically significant coefficient of our de facto measure, the Index of 
Economic Freedom, in both GMM estimates and by a positive, albeit insignificant, effect in the 
other model specifications. The impact of economic freedom is in line with the effect of 
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constitutional variables promoting economic rights. A free and competitive market creates a 
favorable business environment and a level playing field to both incumbent and nascent 
entrepreneurs.  
With respect to control variables, there are several findings of note. First, in the IV-
GMM, GDP per capita is positive and statistically significant, whereas its squared value is 
negative and statistically significant. The positive and negative signs are maintained in all other 
model specifications, although statistical significance disappears. This pattern is consistent with 
the findings from many empirical studies (e.g. Koellinger and Thurik, 2012) and confirms that, 
on the aggregate level, GDP cycles do predict the entrepreneurial cycle although the relationship 
between GDP per capita and entrepreneurship is quadratic. In general, high GDP per capita 
reflects stronger demands, which leads to an abundance of emerging entrepreneurial 
opportunities, and in turn induces new entries to capture such opportunities (Santarelli and Tran, 
2013). Second, a higher labor force participation rate is conducive to more entrepreneurship. 
Provided that a large fraction of new entrepreneurs is usually represented by individuals 
previously involved in paid employment (Storey and Jones, 1987), this last finding is 
straightforward. Third, countries with high electric power consumption per capita and mobile 
cellular subscription are more likely to enjoy a higher rate of new firm formation. 
 
6.2 Illustrating the interaction effect between agency culture and constitutional 
protection  
Based on estimation of the baseline equation by generalized least squares (GLS) 
random-effects (RE) with a robust standard errors model (whose estimation results are 
presented in the final column of Table 6), we used the command “margins” in Stata 14 to 
estimate the margins of responses for specified values of covariates and present the results as a 
table. Finally, to draw the interaction plot we used the command “marginsplot” to graph the 
results of the “margins” command.  Plots were also constructed at each of the five specified 
values of the 'constitutional protection' variable from 0 to 4.  
Figure 1 presents the interaction plots of constitutional protection and agency culture, 
with the aim of capturing the moderating effect of constitutional provisions on psychological 
agency on a country’s proneness toward entrepreneurship.  
- Figure 1 about here -  
 The plot on the right combines all five interaction lines whereas the 5 smaller plots on 
the left separate interaction lines for each value of the constitutional protection variable. The 
combined interaction plot on the right has 5 lines representing the indirect effect of agency 
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culture on new business density at 5 different values of constitutional protection (from 0 to 4). 
For ease of comparison, the interaction plot on the left separates these 5 interaction lines into 5 
charts. Obviously, if the interaction is not significant, the plotted lines should be parallel, which 
is clearly not the case here.  
If a country does not have any constitutional provision supporting economic freedom 
(constprot=0), agency culture is negatively associated with new business density. No matter 
how proactive and innovative its citizens are, they are just simply unmotivated to set up new 
ventures in an environment where they cannot enjoy free competition or the freedom to set up 
business and own their property. Second, when the country increases its constitutional 
protection of economic freedom (constprot increases from 1 to 3), the line representing the 
relationship between agency culture and entrepreneurship moves up gradually, while the impact 
of agency turns from negative to slightly positive. Countries with higher psychological agency 
find themselves more entrepreneurial with a higher rate of self-employment over time when 
they start to apply constitutional provision protecting economic freedom. Finally, the effect of 
psychological agency turns out significantly positive when countries possess a high level of 
constitutional protection (constprot=4).  
These results suggest that high agentic economies enjoying a constitutional protection 
of economic freedom are particularly powerful cradles, nurturing entrepreneurial activity. 
Creative and innovative people are more motivated to exploit their ideas in a transparent and 
healthy business environment in which they do not need to care about bribes or corruption. 
Thus, if governments find that the majority of the country’s population has high levels of 
agency, they could help to capitalize on this entrepreneurial trait by creating a healthy 
institutional environment supporting free competition, business and property rights, and an 
independent judicial system. These steps would significantly foster a dynamic entrepreneurial 
sector within the economy.   
 
7. Conclusions 
Inspired by the central role that the concept of (psychological) agency plays in seminal 
theorizing in entrepreneurship (Schumpeter, 1911, 1934; McClelland, 1961), the present study 
is to our knowledge, the first systematic attempt to examine the effect of agency culture on 
national entrepreneurship rates, with a special focus on an important contextual moderator – 
formal institutions such as constitutional provisions relevant for entrepreneurship. 
In general, our findings reveal that: a) a greater endowment of agency culture is 
associated with a country’s higher willingness or intention to start a business; b) constitutional 
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protection of economic freedom plays a key role in generating the observed wide variation in 
entrepreneurship across countries, by exerting a moderating effect on how a certain endowment 
of  agency culture influences a country’s proneness toward entrepreneurship; c) when 
institutions do support economic freedom, as denoted by higher values of the Index of 
Economic Freedom, entrepreneurship is stronger. In sum, there is an interaction between 
constitutional and legal protection of economic freedom on the one side and the presence in the 
country of a large fraction of individuals characterized by an agentic personality on the other 
side. In particular, there seems to be a benefit from instituting stronger protections of economic 
freedom and such benefit is the stronger the higher the level of agency culture characterizing 
the country. 
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Table 1: List of countries by geographical area 
America: Argentina; Belize; Bolivia; Brazil; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican 
Republic; El Salvador; Guatemala; Jamaica; Mexico; Panama; Peru; United States (USA); 
Uruguay.  
Europe: Albania; Armenia; Austria; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; 
Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia; Malta; Montenegro; 
Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russia; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; 
Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom (UK).  
Africa: Algeria; Ethiopia; Ghana; Kenya; Mauritius; Morocco; Nigeria; South Africa; Uganda.  
Asia: Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Brunei; Egypt; India; Indonesia; Israel; Japan; Jordan; 
Malaysia; Nepal; Oman; Pakistan; Philippines; Qatar; Singapore; South Korea; Sri Lanka; 
Thailand; Turkey; United Arab Emirates (UAE).  
Oceania: Australia; New Zealand. 
 
 
Table 2: Sample size of the individual-level personality dataset for each country 
Country N Country N Country N Country N 
Afghanistan 1,172 Denmark 19,074 Kenya 6,985 Portugal 8,334 
Albania 2,288 Dominican R. 6,222 Korea (South) 9,960 Qatar 2,064 
Algeria 1,074 Egypt 9,075 Latvia 1,440 Romania 13,055 
Argentina 88,211 El Salvador 3,682 Lithuania 2,277 Russia 3,624 
Armenia 1,084 Estonia 2,459 Luxembourg 1,116 Serbia-Mon. 5,665 
Australia 195,857 Ethiopia 1,008 Macedonia 1,121 Singapore 59,119 
Austria 27,143 Finland 23,526 Malaysia 39,606 Slovak Rep. 1,691 
Bangladesh 3,482 France 18,502 Malta 1,590 Slovenia 3,095 
Belgium 43,692 Germany 186,848 Mauritius 1,706 South Africa 26,039 
Belize 1,025 Ghana 1,949 Mexico 136,305 Spain 135,048 
Bolivia 6,115 Greece 10,982 Morocco 1,346 Sri Lanka 3,958 
Bosnia-Her. 1,371 Guatemala 5,635 Nepal 2,142 Sweden 46,828 
Brazil 26,538 Hungary 3,746 Netherlands 163,472 Switzerland 36,741 
Brunei 1,211 India 114,500 New Zealand 43,167 Thailand 8,501 
Bulgaria 3,610 Indonesia 15,199 Nigeria 7,033 Turkey 5,298 
Canada 371,882 Iceland 2,520 Norway 42,859 UAE 14,907 
Chile 44,552 Ireland 41,257 Oman 1,068 Uganda 1,377 
Colombia 34,905 Israel 7,426 Pakistan 27,498 Ukraine 1,081 
Costa Rica 6,712 Italy 13,831 Panama 2,938 UK 438,854 
Croatia 6,920 Jamaica 4,199 Perù 23,056 USA 4,275,860 
Cyprus 2,307 Japan 10,232 Philippines 91,638 Uruguay 6,351 
Czech Rep. 3,566 Jordan 2,431 Poland 7,951   
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Table 3: List of variables and their descriptive statistics: standard deviation is decomposed into 
between and within components 
Variable description Code Mean Std Min Max 
New Business density      overall                    Busdensity 
                                         between  
                                         within   
5.606 4.899 
4.683 
1.516 
0.0201 
0.027 
-2.981 
39.699 
25.826 
19.479 
Constitutional protection overall 
                                         between 
                                         within 
Constprot 2.296 
 
1.135 
1.122 
0.202 
0 
0 
-0.108 
4 
4 
5.091 
Agency culture                overall 
                                         between 
                                         within 
Agency 3.477 0.0738 
0.0736 
0.0083 
3.283 
3.283 
3.387 
3.681 
3.669 
3.557 
Economic freedom          overall 
                                        between 
                                        within 
Ecofreedom 63.851 10.652 
10.533 
1.864 
21.7 
28.29 
56.89 
89.7 
87.99 
73.091 
GDP per capita (log)      overall 
                                       between 
                                       within    
Lngdpcapita 9.307 1.077 
0.981 
0.454 
5.855 
6.631 
6.664 
11.212 
11.133 
11.604 
Labor force participation rate (% of total 
population +15 years old) 
                                  between                                  
                                  within 
Laborforce  
61.921 
 
9.685 
9.232 
3.051 
 
37.1 
39.86 
41.62 
 
87.7 
87.2 
72.08 
Electric consumption per capita (Kwh) 
                                  between 
                                  within 
Electriccon 5100 6210 
6135 
1120 
30.4 
32.57 
-10663 
54799 
43751 
16147 
Mobile cellular subscription per 100 
people                        overall 
                                  between 
                                  within 
Mobilesup 93.814 39.913 
30.305 
26.127 
0.2 
8.345 
-1.986 
217 
156.8 
181.31 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Pairwise correlation matrix (86 countries: average values) 
 Business 
density 
Consprot Agency 
culture 
Economic 
freedom 
GDP per 
capita 
Labor 
force 
Electric 
consump 
Mobile 
subscript 
Busdensity 1.0000        
Constprot 0.2537* 1.0000       
Agency cult 0.2286* 0.2929* 1.0000      
Ecofreedom 0.4087* -0.0938* -0.0120 1.0000     
Gdp capita 0.3218* -0.0026 0.1395* 0.5881* 1.0000    
Labor force 0.0892* -0.0794 -0.1204* 0.0482 -0.0252 1.0000   
Electconsum 0.2736* -0.1627* -0.0712 0.4574* 0.5637* 0.2294* 1.0000  
Mobile sub 0.2990* 0.0959* 0.0327 0.3813* 0.5021* -0.0160 0.3423* 1.0000 
*: significant at 1% level.  
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Table 5: Agency Culture and Entrepreneurship 
Variables Dynamic Blundell-Bond (1998) GMM 
Country-FE with 
Robust SEs 
GLS-RE with Robust 
SEs 
New Business Density, t-1 0.592*** 
(0.033)   
Agency Culture 60.630*** 
(5.433) 
85.985*** 
(15.421) 
61.376*** 
(13.351) 
Economic Freedom 0.127*** 
(0.043) 
-0.016 
(0.031) 
0.027 
(0.032) 
GDP per capita -0.625 
(1.841) 
-1.125 
(1.701) 
-0.915 
(1.763) 
GDP per capita squared 0.042 
(0.101) 
0.059 
(0.101) 
0.050 
(0.097) 
Labor force participation 0.005 
(0.022) 
0.0687*** 
(0.032) 
0.077*** 
(0.032) 
Electric power 
consumption 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.003) 
Mobile cellular 
subscription 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.11*** 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
Intercept -215.11*** 
(20.103) 
-291.13*** 
(53.87) 
-210.47*** 
(47.03) 
F-test  33.33***  
Wald statistics 12 2212.50***  40.40*** 
Observations 774 860 860 
Standard errors in brackets. ***: significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6: Agency Culture, Constitutional Protection, and Entrepreneurship 
Dependent variable: New Business Density 
 
Variables 
IV-GMM with robust SEs4 Dynamic Blundell-Bond (1998) GMM5  Country-FE with robust SEs GLS-RE with 
rob SEs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
New Business Density, t-1    0.707*** 
(0.031) 
0.611*** 
(0.031) 
0.633*** 
(0.031) 
    
Constitutional Protection 0.773** 
(0.346) 
0.635 
(0.401) 
-2.955*** 
(1.059) 
2.627*** 
(0.327) 
2.146*** 
(0.302) 
0.217 
(0.385) 
2.185*** 
(0.605) 
2.264*** 
(0.606) 
9.174 
(27.515) 
-6.084*** 
(1.937) 
Constitutional Protection, t-1    0.106 
(0.411) 
-0.295 
(0.376) 
0.51 
(0.395) 
    
Agency culture  6.583** 
(3.577) 
-1.59** 
(0.645) 
 39.354*** 
(4.705) 
18.098*** 
(5.774) 
 86.766*** 
(15.753) 
94.795*** 
(35.701) 
-5.329 
(16.535) 
Constitutional Protection * 
Psychological agency 
  8.884*** 
(3.049) 
  0.581*** 
(0.089) 
  -2.008 
(7.998) 
18.089*** 
(5.566) 
Economic freedom 0.225*** 
(0.02) 
0.214*** 
(0.022) 
0.222*** 
(0.019) 
0.149*** 
(0.041) 
0.094*** 
(0.038) 
0.131*** 
(0.038) 
0.030 
(0.034) 
0.012 
(0.028) 
0.011 
(0.028) 
0.043 
(0.031) 
GDP per capita 5.26*** 
(2.21) 
4.876*** 
(2.06) 
2.598 
(1.838) 
1.603 
(1.893) 
0.644 
(1.721) 
1.235 
(1.736) 
0.848 
(1.814) 
1.458 
(1.654) 
1.484 
(1.65) 
0.984 
(1.825) 
GDP per capita squared -0.301*** 
(0.122) 
-0.282*** 
(0.114) 
-0.156 
(0.102) 
0.106 
(0.104) 
0.044 
(0.095) 
0.073 
(0.095) 
0.039 
(0.099) 
0.071 
(0.091) 
0.073 
(0.091) 
0.051 
(0.1003) 
Labor force participation rate 0.005 
(0.015) 
0.012 
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
0.022 
(0.022) 
0.002 
(0.021) 
0.008 
(0.021) 
0.061** 
(0.027) 
0.055** 
(0.026) 
0.055** 
(0.026) 
0.062** 
(0.027) 
Electric power consumption per 
capita (Kwh) 
0.0001*** 
(0.000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.0002*** 
(0.000) 
0.0002*** 
(0.000) 
0.0002*** 
(0.000) 
0.0001** 
(0.000) 
Mobile cellular subscription per 
100 people 
0.0105*** 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.008** 
(0.0039) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007**  
(0.003) 
Intercept -35.49*** 
(9.783) 
-55.95*** 
(17.21) 
31.358 
(24.284) 
-6.980 
(8.681) 
-142.94*** 
(18.164) 
-70.531*** 
(21.477) 
3.524 
(8.996) 
-29.65*** 
(5.499) 
-32.414*** 
(12.345) 
16.500 
(58.165) 
F test 51.03*** 44.02*** 44.46***    15.61*** 40.93*** 40.46***  
Wald statistic !"(2)    2095.9*** 2627.6*** 2631.8***    46.61*** 
Under-identification test !"(2) 72.44*** 105.3*** 64.64***        
Over-identification test !"(1) 4.926 4.618 0.815        
Endogeneity test !"(1) 2.78* 3.006* 6.759***        
Observations 860 860 860 774 774 774 860 860 860 860 
Note: *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% significant level respectively 
         (1), (4), (7): Constitutional protection is controlled; (2), (5), (8): Constitutional protection and psychological ‘agency’ trait are controlled; (3), (6), (9): Constitutional protection, psychological 
‘agency’ trait and their interaction are controlled.  
 
																																								 																				
4 Since at least one of the two instruments should vary over time (i.e., the trade share of the economy), the IV GMM model could overcome the time invariance in the regressors 
of interest.  
5 Constitutional protection is treated as an endogenous variable. The first lagged value of constitutional protection is used as IV.  
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Figure 1: Interaction plot of Constitutional Protection and Agency Culture  
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